Beyond Industrialization: New Approaches to Development Strategy Based on the Service Sector by Sheehan, Peter
 
 
Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2008 
* Centre for Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University, Melbourne, email: peter.sheehan@vu.edu.au 
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project on the Southern Engines of Global 
Growth. 
UNU-WIDER acknowledges the financial contributions to the research programme by the governments 
of Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Royal 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency – Sida) 
and the United Kingdom (Department for International Development). 
ISSN 1810-2611  ISBN 978-92-9230-108-8 




New Approaches to Development Strategy 






Industrialization occupies a central place in the rich tapestry of development theory and 
practice. Although that place has varied over time, many have agreed with Nicholas Kaldor 
that the kind of economic growth that leads to high real income per capita can only occur 
through industrialization. This paper argues that it is becoming increasingly difficult for 
most developing countries to achieve rapid growth through industrialization, and especially 
through export oriented activities. But the key mechanisms seen as driving the industrial 
take-off in much of the literature (internal increasing returns, transfer of labour into higher 
value activities and pecuniary externalities) are alive and well, and are evident in services as 
well as in industry. Furthermore, China is actively trying to move from a strategy based on 
industrialization to one based much more on agriculture and services, as the costs of the 
current pattern of industrialization become prohibitive, and India has demonstrated that 
rapid growth based primarily on the services sector is possible. Thus more attention needs 
to be given to strategies based on the expansion of the agricultural and services sectors, and 
to the ways in which better services in rural areas and higher rural output can combine to 
achieve rapid growth and improved human welfare in poor countries. 
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1 Introduction 
Most of the countries that are now developed achieved that status in large part through a 
process of industrialization, involving a substantial shift of capital and labour into 
industrial activity, and a rapid increase in the share of industrial value added in GDP 
during the development process. As a result industrialization occupies a central place in 
the rich tapestry of development theory and practice, although that place has varied as 
those theories and practices have changed over time. Many of the writings of the so-
called ‘high development theory’ period of the 1940s and the 1950s were concerned 
with the conditions for industrialization, and Kaldor wrote (1966: 54) that ‘there can be 
little doubt that the kind of economic growth which involves the use of modern 
technology and which eventuates in high real income per capita, is inconceivable 
without industrialization’.  
Thorbecke (2007) provided a valuable survey of the evolution of development doctrine 
since the heydays of the ‘industrialization-first’ era of the 1950s, showing how the 
prevailing doctrines responded not only to intellectual trends but even more so to the 
major crises in the world economy. He argues that in the 1960s and 1970s there was a 
growing reaction against the emphasis on industry-first and the GNP measure of 
outcomes, with renewed focus on agriculture, on poverty alleviation, on employment 
strategies and on a broad range of measures to promote human capital and welfare. 
During the 1980s much stress was placed on stabilization in the wake of problems for 
developing countries arising from the oil shocks, two global recessions and the Mexican 
crisis of 1982. But as that decade proceeded, development doctrine, reflecting broader 
economic trends, began to emphasize free market themes, including a stress on outward 
orientation intended to encourage exports and industrialization in labour-intensive 
consumer goods. This theme was given impetus by the World Bank’s 1993 report The 
East Asian Miracle, which stressed the role of strong growth in industrial investment, 
exports and output, supported by investment in human capital and in infrastructure and 
by a high savings rate, in driving rapid economic growth. Strong expansion of exports 
into open markets in key economies has been central to East Asian growth, so that the 
industrialization model is closely linked to the benefits of free trade and comparative 
advantage. In the current decade Thorbecke sees less emphasis on ‘big ideas’, important 
progress in technical areas, a clearer realization that human development is the ultimate 
goal of economic development, and an imperative to shape development strategies in 
the light of the reality of globalization. 
This need to shape development strategies in the light of the reality of globalization – 
and especially in the light of China’s extraordinary expansion over the past two decades 
and the emerging impact of its trade on other developing countries – provides the 
motivation in this paper for revisiting the role of industrialization in the contemporary 
development process. At the level of development theory, many studies have addressed 
aspects of the way in which a self-sustaining transition from a traditional to an industrial 
economy can be achieved. These include, for example, Young (1928), Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943), Lewis (1954) and Kaldor (1967). As Krugman (1992) points, some of 
these models have been formalized using the analytical resources embodied in 
endogenous growth theory and new trade theory. One such paper, on which I draw here, 
is that of Murphy, Sheifler and Vishny (1989), who provide a formalization of 
Rosenstein-Rodan’s model of big-push industrialization.    2
In thinking about industrialization, it is important to remember that economic 
development is a process of sustained increase in average living standards or overall 
human welfare in a given country. It is thus, in principle, an open question whether 
industrialization is the most appropriate means for a particular country, or for most 
countries at a given time, to achieve increased average living standards. It is also an 
open question whether, in a given case, current statistical measures (such as real GDP 
per person) provide a reasonable proxy for living standards and human welfare. 
Furthermore, it is clear that there are personal, social and environmental costs associated 
with industrialization, so that the net impact on human welfare is also an important 
issue. 
The case I will argue is that it is becoming increasingly difficult for most developing 
countries to achieve more rapid growth through industrialization, and especially through 
export oriented activities, and this difficulty is likely to increase further. But the key 
mechanisms seen as driving the industrial take-off in the paper noted above and in much 
of the related literature (internal increasing returns, transfer of labour into higher value 
activities and pecuniary externalities) are alive and well, and do not relate only to the 
industrial sector. Furthermore, China is actively trying to move from a strategy based on 
industrialization to one based much more on agriculture and services, as the costs of the 
current pattern of industrialization become prohibitive, and India has demonstrated that 
rapid growth based primarily on the services sector is possible. Thus more attention 
needs to be given to strategies based on the expansion of the agricultural and services 
sectors, and to the ways in which better services in rural areas and higher rural output 
can combine to achieve rapid growth and improved human welfare in poor countries. 
In what follows I develop this argument by briefly considering four building blocks: 
models of industrialization and the experience of the advanced countries (section 2); the 
nature of China’s recent development path (section 3); some constraints on development 
through industrialization (section 4); and the search for a new strategy based on 
agriculture and services in China, and the reality of service-driven growth in India 
(section 5). Conclusions are presented in section 6.1 
2  Industrialization, development and the East Asian model 
2.1  A model of industrialization 
Murphy, Sheifler and Vishny (1989) employ a two sector model, with a cottage 
production sector, operating in competitive conditions at constant returns to scale, and a 
factory sector which operates advanced technology, with increasing returns to scale due 
to the presence of fixed costs internal to the firm. With fixed costs there is imperfect 
competition, and they assume a single monopolist for each industry. Higher wages are 
paid in the factory sector than in the farm sector, to compensate for the disutility of farm 
work. The productivity gain from using the advanced technology is assumed to exceed 
this compensating wage differential, and this assumption is critical to achieving the key 
results. Both types of workers have the same unit elasticity of demand for manufactures 
across all products. Thus there are potential pecuniary externalities for expanded 
                                                 
1   For a recent discussion of some similar themes see Dasgupta and Singh (2007).   3
manufacturing production: increased production (and wages) in one industry will 
increase the demand for the products of other industries, other than through profit 
distribution. 
In each industry there is a cottage sector available and there will be a monopolist 
operating if demand is sufficient. If he enters the monopolist is forced to adopt limit 
pricing, that is to meet the price charged by the cottage sector. The model then shows 
two equilibria, one in which no sectors industrialize and the other in which all sectors 
industrialize. Which situation occurs will depend on the size of the fixed costs, relative 
to productivity gains, incurred in using the increasing returns on technology and on the 
level of demand. For some levels of fixed costs, both equilibria will be possible and in 
these cases the economy is capable of a ‘big push’, that is sustained growth as all of the 
surplus labour is absorbed in the factory sector. The reason for this is the pecuniary 
externality arising from the fact that the wage premium paid by the manufacturing firm 
adds to demand for the products of other sectors, even if the firm itself is not profitable. 
Murphy, Sheifler and Vishny (1989) consider other versions of this model, including 
ones in which increased activity by some firms generates higher future profitability for 
other firms and in which it helps to defray fixed infrastructure costs.  
In these models the source of the multiple equilibria is the pecuniary externalities 
generated by imperfect competition with large fixed costs, in the context of unlimited 
supplies of labour at the going industrial wage rate. On the policy side, Murphy, 
Sheifler and Vishny infer that a government programme which ensures that many 
sectors industrialize simultaneously can boost income and welfare substantially, even 
when investment in any one sector appears unprofitable. This is especially so for an 
economy whose access to foreign markets is restricted by high transportation costs or 
trade restrictions. They cite South Korea as an economy that has successfully 
implemented such a coordinated programme of industrialization. 
There are many other models within the endogenous growth literature which bear on the 
issue of development. For example, many follow Romer (1990) in building models 
based on the idea of external increasing returns due to specialization that goes back to 
Young (1928), to show how endogenous investment in R&D and technology can drive 
growth. Durlauf (1993) uses technological rather than pecuniary externalities with 
internal increasing returns to replicate the ‘leading sectors’ theory of Hirschman (1958). 
Azariadis and Drazen (1990) have replicated a ‘stages of growth’ path similar to that of 
Rostow (1960), in a model with human capital externalities linked to a training regime 
in which private rates of return on human investment depend positively on the existing 
average quality of human resources. 
There is also the question of trade. The Murphy-Sheifler-Vishny (1989) model is for a 
closed economy, and they argue its relevance by pointing to the major role for domestic 
demand in most markets. In a more general sense, one central theme of many 
endogenous growth models is that, while the benefits of trade in terms of global growth 
are enhanced relative to the standard competitive model, these benefits do not 
necessarily flow through to individual countries. When growth is driven by innovation, 
learning by doing or other externalities and these effects are geographically 
concentrated, initial conditions can generate major long-term differences between 
countries in comparative advantage and in growth potential. If the industries in which a 
country is specialized are deficient in relevant respects (e.g. have a lower capacity for 
learning by doing, have lower returns to or lower capacity for R&D or have lower levels   4
of other externalities) then free trade will inhibit the growth of the small country, 
because it will tend to concentrate activity in areas of comparative advantage with lower 
capacity to generate growth.  
Returning to the Murphy-Sheifler-Vishny model of industrialization, the three key 
requirements for self-sustaining industrialization are: 
–  fixed costs and increasing returns in industrial production, internal to the firm; 
–  surplus labour in the traditional sector, and a willingness of that labour to shift to 
the industrial sector at the going industrial wage rate; and  
–  the resulting pecuniary externalities, as the demand arising from higher wage 
incomes increases the demand for products of all industries. 
While recognizing the many complexities touched upon above, I will concentrate on 
these requirements for the rest of this paper. 
2.2  Employment shares in industrialization 
It may be worth commenting briefly on the relevance of these requirements to the 
history of key developed countries. The relevance of increasing returns to both scale and 
scope, internal to the firm, to the development of the USA, UK and Germany has been 
amply demonstrated by Chandler (1990) among others, and he shows that these increasing 
returns apply to distribution as well as production. The existence of pecuniary externalities 
is also widely acknowledged, with authors such as Murphy, Sheifler and Vishny (1989) 
noting that these externalities can be accentuated by urbanization, which might be 
associated with a high elasticity of demand in a wide variety of manufactures. Here we 
focus on the third requirement, the shift of surplus labour from agriculture into industry.  
The industrial revolution originated in the UK which was the first in modern times to 
build an industrial economy. This process began in the eighteenth century, and was well 
advanced by 1820. By that year the share of total employment in British agriculture 
 
Table 1 
Share of employment in industry in total employment,  
selected countries, 1820-2005 
 UK  Germany  USA  Japan  Korea  China 
  (Per cent of total employment) 
1820  32.9 na 15.0 na  na  na 
1870  42.3 28.7 24.4  na  na  na 
1913  44.1 41.1 29.7 17.5  na  na 
1929  45.2 na 29.4  20.9 na  na 
1950  44.9 43.0 33.6 22.6  na  na 
1970 39.5  na  28.5  35.3 16.3 10.2 
1985  26.2 37.8 23.3 34.6 34.7 20.8 
2005  20.5 31.0 17.0 27.5 26.9 23.8 
Sources: 1820-1950: Maddison (1995: 39 and 253); 
  1970-93 (excluding China): OECD STAN Database 2002; 
  2005: OECD Statistics (//stats.oecd.org) for Germany, Japan and Korea; NBSC (2006) for China; 
data for 2005 for USA and UK estimated by the author from national sources.    5
had already fallen to 37.6 per cent, and nearly one third of all employment was in 
industry (Table 1). As the growth in industry continued to drive the expansion of the 
economy through the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the share of total 
employment located in industry reached 45.2 per cent in 1929, immediately prior to the 
depression, and by that time the share of agriculture in total employment had fallen to 
7.7 per cent. These proportions remained fairly stable through to the 1950s. But after 
about 1970, as the structure of the world economy began to change, industry began to 
give way rapidly to services in terms of employment – by 2005 industry provided only 
20 per cent of all jobs, and nearly 80 per cent of total employment in the UK was in 
services. 
This broad pattern, of a strong expansion in industrial employment fed by a transfer 
from agriculture but sooner or later displaced by surging employment in services, is 
apparent in one way or another in the development process of all the major advanced 
economies. Germany followed a similar path to Britain a little later, with the industry 
share of employment reaching 41 per cent in 1913 and 43 per cent in 1950, before 
falling to 31 per cent by 2005. The service sector was important much earlier in the 
USA, but the industry share rose from 15 per cent in 1820 to nearly 30 per cent by 1913, 
and peaked at close to 35 per cent in the early 1950s. But by 2005 only about 17 per 
cent of US jobs were in industry. Japan’s development process began later, and in 1913, 
60 per cent of employment was in agriculture and only 17.5 per cent in industry. But the 
industry share rose rapidly during the first three quarters of the twentieth century, 
peaking at about 37 per cent in 1973 before declining gradually to 27.5 per cent in 2005. 
It is interesting to consider the case of Korea in the prime decades of its rapid 
development, between 1970 and 1990. In these two decades Korea not only grew very 
rapidly (real GDP growing by 8.1 per cent per annum) but experienced rapid structural 
change. In 1970, 51.5 per cent of Korean employment was in agriculture (a figure 
comparable to that of China in 2000), with only 16.3 per cent in industry and 32.1 per 
cent in services. By 1990 the employment share in agriculture had fallen nearly two-
thirds to 18.3 per cent, with more than half of that decline being reflected in rising 
manufacturing jobs. By 1990, 35 per cent of Korean jobs were in manufacturing, while 
the services share had risen to 47 per cent. 
In other words, even as late as the 1980s Korea was following the traditional 
development path in an accelerated fashion, with a pronounced shift of jobs from 
agriculture to secondary industry, and also to services. Over a period of only two 
decades, the share of jobs in manufacturing more than doubled, absorbing more than 
half of the movement of jobs out of agriculture. But in the 1990s the trend reversed 
equally sharply, with the manufacturing share falling from 35 per cent in 1990 to 27 per 
cent of all jobs by 2005. By that year, with about 8 per cent still in agriculture, about 65 
per cent of all Korean jobs were in the services sector. 
These data are supportive of Kaldor’s proposition (1967) that rapid growth in 
manufacturing is a characteristic of an intermediate stage of development, from 
immaturity to maturity. But they also bring out how early this maturity was reached in 
the advanced countries (some 50 years ago for USA, UK and Germany), the extent of 
the shift to services that has taken place in those countries since that time and the degree 
of shift to services over the past decade even in such a late entrant to industrialization as 
Korea. The implications of these trends for contemporary development paths remain to 
be explored. But they do suggest the hypothesis that pursuing a development strategy   6
based on industrialization in the early years of the twenty-first century may be a much 
more difficult task than even three decades ago, as sustained rapid growth in industrial 
employment is difficult to achieve in an open world economy.  
3  The nature of China’s growth, 1979-2006 
In the wake of the achievements of Japan, South Korea and other countries in East Asia, 
China’s remarkable growth since the ‘opening to the market’ in 1979 is often seen as a 
prime example of the East Asian model at work, and as a contemporary example of 
rapid growth through industrialization. China’s growth, it is said, has been driven by 
rapid expansion in industrial output, supported by high levels of investment, strong 
growth in exports, a high level of savings and pro-active government at both central and 
local levels. But before we conclude that China is the classic case of development 
through industrialization there are certain matters that deserve further examination. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the key sectoral growth rates of real GDP since China’s 
opening to the market in the late 1970s. During the immediate post-reform decade, to 
about 1988, both agriculture and services grew rapidly, as a loosening of controls in 
these sectors led to strong expansion. Naughton (2007) graphically describes how the 
early move to a contracting system in agriculture in 1979, and the de facto reinstatement 
of the household farming system, generated sharp increases in the production of grain  
 
Table 2 
Sectoral growth rates in GDP, China, 1978-2006 
 Agriculture  Industry  Services  Total 
 (%) 
1978-88  5.6 11.0 12.9 10.1 
1988-2006  4.1  11.5 9.4 9.5 
1978-2006  4.6 11.3 10.6  9.7 
Note:   These data are based on annual real growth rates expressed in ‘comparable prices’. For details 
see text.  
Source:   NSBC (2006, 2007). 
Table 3 





























































































  At opening values 
 (each period), % 
 
At 1988 values, % 
 
At 2005 values, % 
1979  31.0 47.1 21.9  38.0 40.4 23.8  41.3 29.7 29.0 
1989  20.3 51.1 28.6  25.2 43.7 31.1  28.2 32.9 38.9 
1997  12.4 62.2 25.4  16.2 55.9 29.0  18.8 43.7 37.5 
2001  10.1 63.4 26.5  13.3 57.3 30.4  15.5 44.9 39.5 
2006  7.6 66.5 25.9  10.8 60.4 30.6  12.0 48.3 39.7 
Source:  NBSC (2006, 2007).   7
and other farm products. Given that most of industry was embodied in large state-owned 
firms where a contract system had more limited effects, the impact of reform in industry 
was much more gradual, and over the decade to 1988 services grew more rapidly than 
industry (12.9 per cent per annum by comparison with 11 per cent per annum). But from 
about 1988 the more familiar paradigm applies, with the average growth rate of 
industrial value added over 1978-2006 (11.5 per cent) being about two percentage 
points higher than that of services and of the economy as a whole. Nevertheless, overall 
growth rates of agricultural and services value added of 4.6 per cent and 10.6 per cent 
over nearly three decades 1978-2006 constitute a striking achievement. 
Reflecting the rapid expansion of industry in the command economy period from 
1949-78, by 1978 the Chinese economy was already industrialized, at least in the sense 
that industry provided 48 per cent of GDP at current prices in that year. But this was an 
economy with administered quotas and prices and with few exports, with neither the 
quality nor the price of the output tested in competitive markets. This fact, combined 
with the strong fall in the relative price of manufactured goods that took place after the 
mid-1980s, makes it difficult to provide realistic estimates of sectoral contributions to 
the change in China’s GDP. The National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) 
publishes data for real growth rates in GDP (in total and for the sectors) in ‘comparable 
prices’, which involves valuing year 2’s net value added in terms of year 1’s prices, and 
so on, on a rolling basis, as well as indices compiled from these growth rates. These 
series can be used to create ‘volume’ measures by multiplying the index numbers by the 
current price values for any chosen base year. But the choice of base year will influence 
both the level and the change in the resulting series. Data drawn on three base years are 
reported in Table 2, one for five year periods using the values for the opening year of 
each period as the base, one for an intermediate year (1988) and one for 2005. 
Following the argument of Naughton (2007) that the latest year prices are likely to be 
closest to world market prices, figures on a 2005 base are used in Figure 1.  
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the absolute shares of the three sectors in real GDP over 
1978-2006, while Table 3 shows various estimates of the shares of the sectors in real 
GDP for selected years from 1979-2006. While the estimates differ markedly, they 
show four distinct periods, with the falling share of agriculture common to them all. 
Using the 2005 values as illustrative, from 1979 to 1989 the share of services rose by 10 
percentage points while the share of industry was virtually flat; from 1989 to 1999 the 
share of industry rose by nearly 14 percentage points while the share of services fell; 
from 1997 to 2001, a period of subdued industrial growth in China, the services share 
rose more rapidly than that of industry; finally, rapid growth in the industrial share 
resumed over 2001-06. Overall, and in spite of these data issues, it is fair to say that 
industry has been the central contributor to China’s growth, certainly after 1990, but 
that services have also grown very rapidly. 
This emphasis on the periods before and after 1990 is highlighted by the real value 
added per employee data in Panel B of Figure 1. Up to 1990 labour productivity in the 
three sectors grew at similar, modest rates – 2.8 per cent, 3.6 per cent and 3.3 per cent 
per annum for agriculture, industry and services respectively. After 1990 all growth 
rates have been more rapid, but that in industry has been, at 10.3 per cent per annum,   8
twice that in agriculture and industry (5.1 per cent and 5.3 per cent, respectively).2 All 
these rates of productivity increase are impressive, but in industry output growth of 12.6 
per cent per annum over 1990-2006 was achieved with a growth of only 2.1 per cent in 
employment. 
 
Figure 1  
Value added shares, labour productivity and employment shares,  
by major sector, China, 1978-2006 
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2   There are many complexities to be addressed in interpreting these data. There is a break in the Chinese 
employment data in 1990, although this has little impact on the trends discussed here. The 
employment shakeout in state-owned manufacturing enterprises after about 1996 was massive, and 
must be a significant contributor to the trends noted here. Finally, since 2004 the official data report a 
more rapid growth in employment in industry, with a slowing of productivity growth to about 5 per 
cent, and a sharper decline in employment in agriculture, implying annual gains in rural value added 
per employee of about 10 per cent per annum in recent years. It is too early to be sure what these 
recent figures actually mean.   9
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Source: NBSC (2006, 2007). 
 
Thus in employment terms (Panel C), the story since 1978 is primarily one of services 
rather than industry. Between 1978 and 2006 the agricultural share of employment fell 
by 28 percentage points, from 70.5 per cent to 42.6 per cent. Most of the falling share 
went into services, the share of which rose by 20 percentage points (from 12.2 per cent 
to 32.2 per cent) and 8 percentage points went into industry. Most of the increase in the 
industrial share took place before 1986, and for nearly two decades between 1986 and 
2004 there was no increase in the share of industrial employment. This is hardly the 
traditional industrialization model at work. 
4  Some constraints on development through industrialization 
In this section some of the factors that place constraints on greater involvement by the 
developing countries in manufacturing trade are reviewed, and their recent position in 
global trade in manufactures is noted. 
4.1  Intensified competition in world manufacturing trade 
Perhaps the most obvious factor is the greatly increased competition in world trade, with 
rapid growth in exports from China and the transition economies of Eastern Europe 
adding to strong competition from the newly industrialized countries (NICs). As Table 4 
shows, by 2005 the manufactured exports of this group totalled over US$1.4 trillion, 
having increased by 14.3 per cent per annum (double the rate of such exports from all 
other countries) over 1990-2005, and by 15.6 per cent per annum in the world trade 
boom since 2000. Growing competition from these sources of supply must put increased 
pressure on the exports of developing countries, while also leading to increased import 
penetration.  
By far the most important case is that of China, whose longer-term export orientation 
has been given new impetus by its entry into the WTO in 2001. Between 2001 and 2005 
China’s total merchandise exports grew by 30 per cent per annum, from US$266 billion 
in 2001 to US$762 billion in 2005; as a result, China’s share of world trade (excluding   10
Hong Kong) nearly doubled from 3.9 per cent in 2000 to 7.3 per cent in 2005 (WTO 
2006). This rapid growth has continued since 2005, with exports increasing 27.2 per 
cent in 2006 and by 26.7 per cent in the first half of 2007 relative to the same period of 
2006. China’s share of world merchandise trade could reach 15 per cent by 2015, and 
continue to rise thereafter, and a very high proportion of China’s exports are 
manufactured goods. But China’s growth has also led to a rapid growth in its imports 
(which increased by 27 per cent per annum, from US$244 billion in 2001 to US$792 
billion in 2006).  
Such surging trade growth must inevitably have major impacts on other countries, both 
developed and developing. Given the nature of China’s growth and trade, there is a 
theoretical expectation that this impact will vary sharply across countries (Ianchovichina 
and Walmsley 2005). In Japan and the NICs of Asia (such as South Korea and Taiwan), 
which produce intermediate and capital goods for use in China, the boost to exports to 
China should more than offset increased competition in their export markets. A similar 
effect is evident in Australia, where induced investment in resources seems to have 
more than offset increased competition in manufactured goods. But in poorer countries, 
competing with China in world markets for consumer goods but with more limited 
ability to supply China’s import needs, the impact could be sharply negative.  
In one of the few empirical studies of these issues, Eichengreen, Rhee and Hui Tong 
(2007) find support for this differential impact in an econometric study of 13 Asian 
economies. They find a general tendency for China’s exports to crowd out exports from 
other Asian countries, but that this is largely confined to consumer goods. For example, 
a 10 per cent increase in China’s exports of textiles leads on average to a 4 per cent fall 
 
Table 4 
Global manufacturing exports, by selected countries and regions, 1990-2005 
 Manufactured  exports 
(US$billion) 
  Rate of growth of manufactured 
exports (% per annum) 
  1990 2000 2005    1990-2000  2000-05  1990-2005 
OECD  countries  2041.2 3676.4 5339.0    6.1 7.7  6.6 
Rapid export growth regions              
SE Asian NICs  129.9  389.4  546.1    11.6 7.0  10.0 
China    46.0 222.3 702.6    17.1 25.9  19.9 
Transition economies 16.2  74.4  169.4    16.5 17.9  16.9 
Total 192.2  686.2  1418.1    13.6 15.6  14.3 
Other developing countries              
Brazil  16.1 31.8 61.6    7.0 14.1 9.3 
India  12.5 34.6 69.8    10.7 15.1  12.1 
South  Africa  8.3 20.2 30.7    9.3 8.7  9.1 
All other countries  93.1 238.1 334.8    9.8 7.1  8.9 
Total    114.0 293.0 435.2    9.9 8.2  9.3 
World  2347.4 4655.6 7192.3    7.1 9.1  7.8 
Note:   Data for China exclude exports from Hong Kong, but include China’s exports to Hong Kong. The 
world total excludes exports from Hong Kong that are re-exports of imports from other countries, 
notably China. 
Source:   WTO (2006).   11
in textile exports from other Asian countries. They also find a strong tendency for 
increased exports from these countries to China, but this is mainly in the market for 
capital goods. Thus China’s rapid growth has positive effects on its high-income 
neighbours but negative effects on the less-developed countries in the region. Their 
findings for Indonesia are mixed, with a positive effect through intermediate goods 
(defined as including energy supplies) broadly offsetting substantial crowding out of 
consumer goods exports. This study uses data only up to 2003 and a simple 
capital/intermediate/consumer goods classification, but nevertheless provides some 
confirmation for concerns that China’s rapid trade growth could have adverse effects for 
some poorer developing countries.  
4.2  Fragmentation and increasing technological requirements in manufacturing 
A wide range of changes in the nature of global manufacturing that have taken place 
over the last 10-15 years also make it more difficult for developing countries outside 
East Asia to expand manufactured exports. One important such change is the rise of so-
called fragmentation trade, whereby parts, components and finished goods are often 
assembled in different places under the over control of a global integrator. Such 
fragmented or networked trade may take different forms in different industries – such as 
production of components to agreed specifications in the ICT and motor vehicles 
industries, or sub-contracting by tender of final production to a pre-determined design 
and specification in the TCF industries – but is now very important overall. For 
example, in a study of trade in machinery and transport equipment, Athukorala (2006) 
found that the share of parts and components in total machinery and transport imports 
globally was 44 per cent, and that for the countries of East Asia as a whole it was just on 
50 per cent. 
These and related factors mean that other developing countries face two challenges to 
rapidly expanding exports: gaining access to the networks that control a rising share of 
world manufacturing trade (and doing so at a price that is profitable) and achieving the 
technological level for production to the exacting quality standards now required in 
world markets. Again it seems likely that the demands for quality and performance, and 
for the availability of the production technology that can meet these demands, will 
increase further, for example as a new round of performance specifications are imposed 
to reduce energy use and to make products more environmentally sustainable.   
4.3  The position of manufacturing in poorer countries 
In spite of these constraints, developing countries outside East Asia have achieved some 
growth in exports of manufactures, as indicated in Tables 4 and 5. India, Brazil and 
South Africa have each increased their share of global manufacturing exports over 
1990-2005, India substantially (from 0.5 per cent to 1.0 per cent) and Brazil and South 
Africa more modestly (0.7 per cent to 0.9 per cent and from 0.35 per cent to 0.43 per 
cent, respectively). The share of manufactured exports captured by all other developing 
countries also rose from 4.0 per cent in 1990 to 4.7 per cent in 2005, with the major 
contributors being machinery and transport and ICT exports from developing countries 
in South East Asia and chemicals and clothing exports from other developing   
countries. But after 2000, as the impact of China began to intensify, trends in these 
countries diverged sharply. Over 2000-05 exports of manufactures from both Brazil and   12
India continued to grow at rates above the global figure, and their shares increased. But 
growth was below the global average for South Africa, and the share of all other 
developing countries in world manufactured exports fell from 5.1 per cent in 2000 to 4.7 
per cent in 2005. As a result, the share of all developing countries outside the rapid 
export growth regions fell over this five year period. 
Another perspective on the role of manufacturing is the distribution of real 
manufacturing value added (MVA) across countries, and Table 6 summarizes some 
recent estimates. Outside the industrialized countries, China and the NICs, all 
developing countries accounted for only 3.5 per cent of world MVA in 2006. While this 
is a significant increase on their share in 1996, the rate of increase has slowed since 
2001 and is small in relation to the growth of China. On these estimates China captured 
an increased 2.2 percentage points of world MVA between 2001 and 2006, while the 
rise for all other developing countries was only 0.2 percentage points. 
 
Table 5 
Shares of global manufacturing trade, by selected countries and regions,  
1990-2005 
  Share of manufactured exports (%) 
 1990  2000  2005 
OECD countries  87.0  79.0  74.2 
Rapid export growth regions       
SE Asian NICs  5.5  8.4  7.6 
China   2.0  4.8  9.8 
Transition economies  0.7  1.6  2.4 
Total 8.2  14.7  19.7 
Other developing countries       
Brazil 0.7  0.7  0.9 
India 0.5  0.7  1.0 
South Africa  0.4  0.4  0.4 
All other countries 4.0  5.1  4.7 
Total   4.9  6.3  6.1 
World 100.0  100.0  100.0 
Note:  Data for China exclude exports from Hong Kong, but include China’s exports to Hong Kong. The 
world total excludes exports from Hong Kong that are re-exports of imports from other countries, 
notably China. 
Source:   WTO (2006). 
Table 6 
Distribution of real manufacturing value added,  
by major country grouping 








  (% of world total) 
1996 79.6  13.0  4.6  2.8 
2001 77.5  13.1  6.1  3.3 
2006 73.3  14.8  8.3  3.5 
Source: UNIDO database.   13
These data clearly require closer and more detailed analysis, but they appear to support 
the view that, while manufacturing will continue to play an important role in the growth 
of many countries, in current conditions ‘big-push’ industrialization is unlikely to drive 
the growth of any new developing countries outside East Asia in the foreseeable future.3 
Indeed, when enhanced import competition is also included, the existing manufacturing 
sectors in some countries could be under threat.  
5  Development strategies based on agriculture and services 
The final building block of my argument concerns the role of alternative strategies 
based on agriculture and services in the two major developing countries of the world: 
China is urgently seeking to develop such a strategy and India has, in fact, been 
implementing one.  
5.1  Towards a new development strategy in China 
In the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2006-11) China decided to pursue fundamental changes 
in its development strategy in the light of emerging problems. These problems – ranging 
from heavy energy use and serious pollution, uncontrolled fixed asset investment, and 
limited benefits being delivered to many in the population and growing inequality, 
especially in access to health and education – have led the government to search for 
policies to create a ‘balanced and harmonious society’ as the key national priority. Some 
of the issues being widely discussed within China include:  
–  the limited improvement in living conditions being achieved in rural areas, where 
the majority of the population still live, and the social tensions to which that may 
give rise;  
–  the pervasive impact of pollution and environmental damage, to the point of 
seriously reducing quality of life;  
–  the massive reliance on energy, and the costs involved in securing energy 
supplies to meet burgeoning demand; 
–  the deepening inequality in various dimensions, including east-west and urban-
rural divergence as well as rising inequality in urban areas;  
–  constraints on the growth of education and health, and the growing importance of 
private income in gaining access to these essential services;  
–  high rates of household savings, in part a response to the need to accumulate 
funds to meet anticipated education and health expenses; and  
–  the macroeconomic vulnerability of the economy, with growth driven by soaring 
exports and high rates of FDI leading to excessive exposure to global trends and 
to acute problems in managing the exchange rate and domestic monetary 
conditions. 
                                                 
3   Within East Asia such growth may be possible in Vietnam, where close links to China and other 
rapidly growing countries in East and Southeast Asia may enable Vietnam to be integrated into 
rapidly expanding trade and industrial activities in the region.   14
Many of the issues with the present expansion have been recognized by the Chinese 
government, and are being actively addressed in the process of implementing the 
Eleventh Plan. In his March 2006 Report on the Work of the Government, Premier Wen 
Jiabao said of the issues arising from the Tenth Plan period (2001-05): 
The main problems were an unbalanced economic structure, weak 
capacity for independent innovation, slow change in the pattern of 
economic growth, excessive consumption of energy and resources, 
worsening environmental pollution, serious unemployment, imbalance 
between investment and consumption, widening gaps in development 
between urban and rural areas and between regions, growing disparities 
between certain income groups, and inadequate development of social 
programmes. We need to work hard to solve all these problems. 
It is also widely recognized that more serious social unrest than at present is possible if 
these issues are not resolved.  
As one observer has written, China’s Eleventh Five Year Plan proposals for the period 
2006-10 are remarkable: 
There emerges from this Plan document a rich and comprehensive vision 
of a sustainable development process in China, and a glimpse of the kind 
of government role that would be required by this development process. 
The vision is of a society that is more creative, more focused on human 
resource development, and treads with a lighter and more 
environmentally benign step (Naughton 2006: 9). 
But it is one thing to outline a vision of a sustainable economy and a harmonious society 
and quite another to define and implement a detailed set of programmes to give effect to 
this vision. This is especially so in such a diverse, vibrant and internationally engaged 
society as contemporary China. The forces shaping the current growth pattern – from the 
role of local governments and the limited power of the central government, the strong 
influence of foreign companies and investors and the level of the exchange rate to the 
popular desire for a strong China and a better life – are complex and inter-related, and it 
will take a major effort to re-align them. Over the first one-third of the Plan period, 
progress in changing direction seems to have been limited. But achieving this re-direction 
remains a central commitment of the Chinese government, and either success or failure 
will have important implications both for China and for the world economy as a whole. 
5.2  Rapid growth led by the service sector in India 
The second case is that of India, which has recently achieved rapid growth in GDP, of 
the order of 7-9 per cent per annum, in the past few years in a services oriented 
economy. While India is striving to increase the role of manufacturing and of goods 
exports, the fact remains that the Indian acceleration has been driven by services, and by 
service exports, rather than by the industrial sector. As documented below, in India over 
2000-05 the service sector provided two-thirds of the increase in real GDP.  
There are many distinctive features of the Indian growth model, especially by 
comparison with that which has become common in East Asia. These include gradual   15
rather than sharp acceleration; a reliance on services and domestic consumption rather 
than on industry and exports; an emphasis on high technology and ICT services rather 
than on low-cost labour inputs to manufactured exports; growth driven by local private 
entrepreneurs as government withdraws rather than by government agencies and 
enterprises or foreign investors; low reliance on foreign direct investment; and, more 
generally, more emphasis on increased productivity than on a rapid increase in the 
factors of production (capital and labour).  
Perhaps the most striking of these features is the heavy reliance on services. Table 7 
illustrates the central role of the service sector as the driver of growth in India, in stark 
contrast with the current position in China. In 2005 industry (defined as including 
mining, manufacturing, energy production and water, and construction) amounted to 
only 19.3 per cent of GDP in constant 1999-2000 prices in India, by comparison with 
47.5 per cent in China (see Table 7). In terms of growth contribution the difference is 
even greater: the service sector provided 73.5 per cent of growth in real GDP in India 
over 2000-05, by comparison to 41.6 per cent in China; industry provided 52.3 per cent 
of growth over this period in China, but little over half that in India (17.8 per cent). This 
is a stark difference between the two economies, and India’s recent growth can truly be 
described as driven by the services sector.  
Table 7 
Role of industry and services in India and China 
 
Share in GDP,  
2005 (%) 
Real growth rate 
(% per annum) 
Share of GDP growth,  
2000-05 (%) 
 China  India  China  India  China  India 
Agriculture 12.6  19.9 3.9  2.6 6.1 8.6 
Industry 47.5  19.3  10.7 6.1 52.3 17.8 
Services   39.9  60.7 10.0 8.6 41.6 73.5 
Total 100.0  100.0  9.5 6.8  100.0  100.0 
Notes:   For China 2005 values are used as the base. Data for India is for the year 2005-06 (the year 
ending 31 March 2006) and for the five years to 2005-06, and is in constant 1999-2000 prices. 
Source:   NBSC (2006); GoI (MOSPI) (nd). 
Figure 2 
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Note:   Based on data at constant 1993-94 prices until 1998-99, and on data at constant 1999-2000 
prices from 1999-2000. Thus there is a (small) break in the series at this point. 
Source:   GoI (MOSPI) (nd); China NBSC (2006, 2007).   16
Table 8 
Structure of Indian real GDP and GDP growth, 1999-2000 to 2004-05 
 
Growth rate 
1999-2000 to 2004-05 
Share of GDP 
2004-05 
  (% per annum)  (%) 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing    1.8  20.8 
Mining and quarrying    4.8    2.2 
Manufacturing    6.4  15.1 
Electricity, gas and water supply    3.5    2.2 
Construction    8.2    6.5 
Trade, hotels and restaurant    7.9  15.5 
Transport, storage and communication  12.6  10.0 
Finance, insurance, real estate and business services    6.6  13.4 
Community, social and personal services    5.4  14.3 
Gross domestic product at factor cost    6.0  100.0 
Source:   GoI (MOSPI) (nd). 
 
Figure 2 places this trend in broader historical context, making clear that it is by no 
means recent phenomenon. Over the past thirty years the reduction in the share of 
agriculture in GDP has been almost completely offset by the growth of the service 
sector, rather than by any significant rise in the industrial share. 
What does such services driven growth look like? Table 8 shows that over the five years 
to 2004-05 three sectors – trade, hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and 
communication; and finance, insurance, real estate and business services – all grew at 
above the national growth rate, and in 2004-05 provided nearly 40 per cent of GDP. 
This may indeed be ‘big-push’ growth driven by services, as there is every reason for 
supposing that many such activities are associated with the key conditions of fixed costs 
and increasing returns, increasing use of labour at higher productivity levels and 
pecuniary externalities.  
6 Conclusions   
There are a number of theories of the link between industrialization and development, 
but one simple yet robust model, that of Murphy, Sheifler and Vishny (1989), captures 
many of the elements of earlier work. In this two-sector model the key elements are 
increasing returns, internal to the firm, in a modern sector; a substantial surplus labour 
in the traditional sector willing to move, with a wage premium to the modern sector; and 
pecuniary externalities between industries within the modern sector, whereby expansion 
in one sector increases the demand for the output of other sectors even if it is 
individually unprofitable. There is evidence that these conditions were met by the 
industrial sector during the development of key advanced countries, although in 
latecomers such as Korea the shift of labour into industry was reversed at a relatively 
early stage of development. But there is nothing about these conditions that inherently 
relate to industry or manufacturing – any ‘modern’ sector meeting the conditions of 
increasing returns, labour shift to higher productivity uses and pecuniary externalities 
could drive sustained growth. These conditions could be met by many service 
industries.   17
China’s development is a particularly interesting and important case in point. The initial 
phase of China’s growth after 1979 was driven more by agriculture and services than by 
industry, but from about 1990 industry has been the major contributor to China’s 
growth. In this sense China has experienced a process of industrialization over the past 
two decades. But in terms of employment the predominant shift has been from 
agriculture to services between 1978 and 2006, and the share of industrial employment 
was flat for nearly two decades to 2004. Thus this period cannot be regarded as big-push 
industrialization as characterized by Murphy, Sheifler and Vishny (1989). But if many 
parts of China’s service industries (such as communications, transport, wholesale trade 
and distribution and business services) meet their three conditions, there is no reason 
why this experience should not be described as a big-push driven in part by the service 
sector. Further, India’s rapid growth can plausibly be regarded as a service-led big-push, 
as services provided nearly three-quarters of the increase in real GDP in India over the 
five years to 2005-06.  
I suggest that a central challenge for development theory and practice now is to 
understand and implement rapid growth based on services, and on a closer link between 
services and the rural sector. Little is understood about how to stimulate service growth 
in a developing country, as China’s difficulties in changing strategies suggest. But 
industrialization as it used to be understood is no longer a realistic option for most 
developing countries, and they need to find ways of participating in the growth of the 
modern services sector, which can directly improve the living standards of their people. 
References 
Asariadis, C., and A. Drazen (1990). ‘Threshold Externalities in Economic 
Development’. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105 (2): 501-26. 
Athukorala, P. (2006). ‘Singapore and ASEAN in the New Regional Division of 
Labour’. RSPAS Working Paper 2006-11. Canberra: Australian National University. 
Chandler, A. (1990). Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Harvard: 
The Belknap Press. 
Dasgupta, S., and A. Singh (2007). ‘Manufacturing, Services and Premature 
Deindustrialization in Developing Countries: A Kaldorian Analysis’. In G. Mavrotas 
and A. Shorrocks (eds), Advancing Development: Core Themes in Global 
Economics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan for UNU-WIDER. 
Durlauf, S. (1993). ‘Nonergodic Economic Growth’. Review of Economic Studies, 60, 
(203): 349-66. 
Eichengreen, B., Y. Rhee, and Hui Tong (2007). ‘China and the Exports of Other Asian 
Countries’. Review of World Economics, 143 (2): 201-07.  
GoI (Government of India) (nd). Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. 
Available at: www.mospi.nic.in.  
Hirschman, A. (1958). The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Ianchovichina, E., and T. Walmsley (2005). ‘Impact of China’s WTO Accession on 
East Asia’. Contemporary Economic Policy, 23 (2): 261-77.   18
Kaldor, N. (1966). The Causes of the Slow Rate of Growth in the United Kingdom, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kaldor, N. (1967) Strategic Factors in Economic Development. Ithaca: Cornell 
University. 
Krugman, P. (1992). ‘Towards a Counter-Counterrevolution in Development Theory’. 
Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Lewis, W. A. (1954). ‘Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour’. 
Manchester School of Economic and Political Studies, 22 (2): 139-91. 
Maddison, A. (1995). Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992. Paris: OECD. 
Murphy, K., A. Sheifler, and R. Vishny (1989). ‘Industrialization and the Big Push’. 
Journal of Political Economy, 97 (October): 1003-26. 
Naughton, B. (2006). ‘The New Common Economic Program: China’s 11th Five Year 
Plan and What It Means’. China Leadership Monitor, 16. 
Naughton, B. (2007). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
NBSC (2006). China Statistical Yearbook 2006. Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics 
China. 
NBSC (2007). ‘Statistical Communiqué on the 2006 National Economic and Social 
Development’, 28 February. Beijing. Available at: www.stats.gov.cn/ 
english/newsandcomingevents/t20070301_402388091.htm. 
OECD Statistics. Available at: www. stats.oecd.org 
Rosenstein-Rodan, P. (1943). ‘Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe’. Economic Journal, 53: 202-11. 
Romer, P. (1990). ‘Endogenous Technological Change’. Journal of Political Economy, 
98 (5-part 2): 71-102. 
Rostow, W. (1960). The Stages of Economic Growth. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Thorbecke, E. (2007). ‘The Evolution of Development Doctrine, 1950-2005’. In   
G. Mavrotas and A. Shorrocks (eds), Advancing Development: Core Themes in 
Global Economics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan for UNU-WIDER.. 
Wen Jiabao (2006). ‘Report on the Work of the Government 2006’. Report delivered at 
the Fourth Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on March 5. Beijing: 
People’s Republic of China. Available at: www//english.gov.cn/official/2006-
03/14/content_227248.htm. 
WTO (World Trade Organization) (2006). International Trade Statistics 2006. Geneva: 
WTO.  
Young, A. (1928). ‘Increasing Returns and Economic Progress’. Economic Journal, 38: 
527-42. 
 